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ABSTRACT
Philosophers have established that certain ethically important val-
ues are modally robust in the sense that they systematically deliver
correlative benefits across a range of counterfactual scenarios. In
this paper, we contend that recourse – the systematic process of
reversing unfavorable decisions by algorithms and bureaucracies
across a range of counterfactual scenarios – is such a modally ro-
bust good. In particular, we argue that two essential components
of a good life – temporally extended agency and trust – are under-
written by recourse.
We critique existing approaches to the conceptualization, op-
erationalization and implementation of recourse. Based on these
criticisms, we suggest a revised approach to recourse and give ex-
amples of how it might be implemented – especially for those who
are least well off1.
KEYWORDS
recourse, algorithmic decision making, precarity, robust goods
ACM Reference Format:
Suresh Venkatasubramanian and Mark Alfano. 2020. The philosophical
basis of algorithmic recourse. In Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency (FAT* ’20), January 27–30, 2020, Barcelona, Spain. ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 10 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372876
1 INTRODUCTION
Human agents are distinctive among animals in the amount of long-
term planning they engage in. We make plans that may come to
fruition days, weeks, years, or even decades in the future. In some
cases we even plan for events that will occur only after our own
deaths. Such planning is remarkable not just for the amount of time
involved but also for the level of recursive means-end reasoning
involved. If your ultimate aim is, for instance, to vacation next year
in Hawaii, you might go about it by saving money in order to be
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1We focus on the least well off because this is arguably the most defensible principle
from an ethical and political point of view.[27]
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able to purchase a ticket. And you might go about saving money by
getting a second job. And you might go about getting a second job
by receiving certification to work that job. And you might go about
receiving certification by taking vocational training courses. In this
scenario, you take training in order to receive certification in order
to get a second job in order to save money in order to purchase
airfare in order to go to Hawaii. Such plans are only likely to succeed
in a sufficiently well-ordered system, in which the reasons things
might go wrong are foreseeable and understandable, and in which
errors can be identified and rectified. If you could not trust that
the vocational training would be sufficient to get certified, it would
not make sense to plan in this way. Likewise, if you could not trust
that hyperinflation would not destroy your savings, it would not
make sense to plan in this way. The kind of agency that we both
expect to be able to exercise and in many cases actually do exercise
presupposes that our society is organized in a sufficiently regular,
understandable, and corrigible way, which makes it possible to trust
that the elaborate, temporally-extended planning we engage in is
likely to be successful.
Among the things people typically make long-term plans for
are various essential primary goods, such as housing. Computer
scientists interested in algorithmic fairness have tended to focus on
the distribution of such goods. In this paper, we are also concerned
with their nature. In particular, we are interested in the fallback
mechanisms and dispositions that people may be able to take ad-
vantage of when they lack an important primary good. In recent
years, social scientists have begun to study the growing instability
surrounding access to various primary goods. Researchers some-
times speak of the problem of precarity[5, 11, 21], which broadly
speaking can be characterized as a state of precarious existence (or
precarious access to resources like employment, housing, health
care and so on) in which small “shocks” can remove access to such
critical resources. Someone who suffers a precarious existence lacks
financial and social security, which impinges on their ability to en-
gage in temporally extended agency. They may have housing and a
steady job today, but if anything were to go wrong in their life (e.g.,
a chronic illness, an unexpected financial burden, a parking ticket),
they would lose their housing or job. A recent study in the state
of New Jersey found that loss of driving privileges due to license
suspension (which is often used as a punishment for reasons unre-
lated to driver safety) led to severe collateral impacts: 42% of the
people whose license had been suspended reported reported losing
their jobs [6]. This is unsurprising in a state with inadequate public
transport: if you can’t get to work, it’s hard to hold down a job.
Furthermore, of those who reported losing their job, 45% reported
being unable to find a new job, and 88% of those who did find new
employment reported a decrease in income.
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In a similar vein, a recent survey by bankrate.com found that only
41% of American adults would be able to cover an unexpected cost
of $500 from their existing finances2. Likewise, the Federal Reserve
Board [25] found that 46% of adults in the United States could
not cover an emergency expense of $400 without having to sell
something or borrow money. Someone who suffers from precarity
in this waywill find it hard to engage in temporally extended agency
and to trust that their plans will come to fruition. They face a life
of constant worry and stress, and such worry and stress can have
knock-on effects that feed back into the precariousness of their
existence. For example, stress and anxiety may lead someone to
snap at their boss, which could get them fired. Elizabeth Anderson
[2, pg. 63] estimates that approximately 80% of American workers
– essentially, all those who are “neither securely self-employed nor
upper-level managers” – are just “one arbitrary and oppressive
managerial decision away” from being fired, demoted, or otherwise
mistreated by the pervasive “authoritarian governance in our work
and off-hours lives.”
1.1 The modally robust good of recourse
The examples described in the previous section and others like
them suggest that people will often need some way to reverse
unfavorable decisions that would otherwise impair their ability not
only to accomplish one particular goal but also to accomplish all of
the other goals that it is a means to. For example, someone who is
counting on a loan in order to purchase a car in order to be able to
drive to a well-paying job in order to take care of their family might
be denied that loan. In such a case, the denial affects not just their
immediate financial situation but their whole life plan. If someone
cannot trust that they will have some way of overcoming challenges
that thwart the crucial means to their long-term ends, they will have
little reason to try to engage in the temporally-extended agency
characteristic of mature adults.
We live in a world in which many decisions that significantly
affect our ability to exercise temporally-extended agency are made
by algorithms and bureaucracies3. These algorithms and bureaucra-
cies establish a system of incentives and disincentives that apply to
both the ends that people might pursue for their own sake and the
means to those ends. If you want to enter a profession, you typically
need to receive some sort of certification. If you want to make a
large purchase, you may need to take out a loan (that you can pay
back at a reasonable interest rate in a reasonable amount of time).
If you want to travel internationally, you need to get a passport
and potentially also a visa. Across a vast range of sectors, decisions
that fundamentally affect people’s lives and their ability to engage
in long-term planning are made by algorithms and bureaucracies.
Sometimes, those decisions are unfavorable. When they are, the
subject of the decision can only reasonably plan their subsequent
course of action if they know what it would take to receive a more
favorable decision. After all, a desired or hoped-for end can only
become the target of a plan if the agent is able to select a means to
that end. Moreover, this need to be able to plan applies not just to
one-off cases, but generally over the course of one’s life. As such,
2https://www.bankrate.com/finance/consumer-index/money-pulse-0117.aspx.
Accessed 5 May 2019.
3For a critical history of this phenomenon, see [19]
someone can be positioned in such a way that they know or rea-
sonably expect that, were things to go wrong, they would be able
to set them right again. Such positioning refers not only to the way
things currently are but also to how they might be across a range
of counterfactual scenarios.
As such, we need some way to ensure that people both have
some way of getting unfavorable decisions reversed and know, in
general, that they will have a way of getting unfavorable decisions
reversed. Let us define the enjoyment of recourse as being in such a
position. Recourse systematically delivers the benefit of reversing
harmful decisions by algorithms and bureaucracies across a range
of counterfactual scenarios4. If someone enjoys recourse, then not
only are they able to get a single decision reversed, but they also
enjoy the power to reverse decisions across a range of counterfac-
tual scenarios. As such, someone who enjoys recourse need not
passively suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, but is
positioned to take up arms against a sea of troubles. They do not
suffer from what Condorcet [3, 11:161, 191] considered one of the
most debilitating aspects of poverty: “the idea of being counted for
nothing, of being delivered up, without defense, to all vexations
and all outrages.”
It is illuminating in this context to refer to recent work by Philip
Pettit [26], who has argued that a wide range of ethically important
values are modally robust5. For a good to be modally robust in
Pettit’s sense, it must systematically deliver some other benefit
in a range of counterfactual scenarios. For instance, according to
Pettit, people value the non-robust good of favor, and therefore
also value the robust good of friendship, which delivers favor in a
range of counterfactual scenarios. If someone is your friend, not
only do they favor you now, but also they would be disposed to
favor you in a range of nearby possible worlds. Friends are disposed
to put one another back on course rather than simply abandoning
each other when the going gets tough [1], and there are derogatory
natural language expressions (e.g., ‘fair-weather friend’) for people
whose favor cannot be counted on in a broad enough range of
4Thus, we distinguish between particular token acts of exercising recourse (reversing
a single harmful decision) and the general state of enjoying systematic access to the
power to reverse harmful decisions (knowing that if a harmful decision were to be
made, one would be able to get it reversed).
5In philosophy, robustness of this sort is understood in terms of counterfactual con-
ditionals. Unlike the material conditional, “If p, then q,” the truth conditions for the
counterfactual conditional, “if p were the case, then q would be the case” refer not
only to the world as it actually is but also to various ways the world could be. There
are multiple, competing analyses, but the most prominent hold that the conditional
is true just in case, in the most “nearby” possible world(s) in which p is true, q is
also true (Stalnaker 1968, Lewis 1973). A world counts as “nearby” if it differs only
slightly from the actual world. In statistics, robustness is a property of an estimator (a
quantity computed from a sample that purports to be an estimate of a population-level
property). For example, we might ask what the mean salary of all residents of the
United States is. To estimate this quantity, we might sample 1000 people at random
and average their salaries. This sample mean is an estimator of the population mean,
and we can determine the extent to which the sample mean is a good proxy for the
population mean. An estimator can be very sensitive to corruption in the data. For
example, the sample mean could deviate arbitrarily from the population mean if even
one point of the sample has a corrupted salary entry that is arbitrarily large. A robust
estimator is an estimator that is resilient to small amounts of data corruption. For
example, if we instead computed the median of the sample rather than its mean, this
is a robust estimator for the population median because the median of a collection of
numbers does not change significantly if even a fraction of the points are corrupted.
Referring back to the idea of a robust good, we can think of a robust estimator as one
that is valid in “nearby” worlds where only small amounts of data corruption exist
(note that the notion of “near” refers to the number of points that are corrupted, rather
than the amount of corruption).
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counterfactual scenarios. Beyond friendship, Pettit argues, people
value a variety of other robust goods. The virtue of honesty is a
robust good that delivers the non-robust benefit of truth-telling
in a range of counterfactual scenarios. If someone is honest, you
can trust them to tell you the truth when they have no incentive to
lie, but also to tell you the truth were lying to be to their benefit.
Likewise, the robust good of respect delivers the non-robust benefit
of non-interference in a range of counterfactual scenarios.
According to Pettit, robust goods are valuable because they are
“resilient enough to survive situational shifts” (p. 24), and thus
deliver their correlative non-robust goods both “as things actually
are” and “as they would be under certain variations” (p. 46). For this
reason, when we are assured that someone embodies a robust good,
we can live free from anxiety and fear that the correlative non-
robust benefit (and everything that depends on it) will suddenly
be snatched away without notice or warning. Robust goods thus
systematically deliver, as a side-effect, peace of mind and warrant
for trust.
While Pettit’s account focuses primarily on robust goods as they
are embodied in individual humans, it is also possible for a social
group or an institution to embody a robust good. For example, a
fail-safe nuclear reactor is a complex socio-technical system in
which multiple layers of safeguards are put in place. When such a
reactor is working as designed, it delivers two non-robust benefits
in a range of counterfactual scenarios: namely, electrical power
and safety from radiation. If something were to go wrong – either
mechanically or via human error – in a fail-safe reactor, multiple
alerts and protective actions would be triggered that would (at
least if it works as designed) set the reactor on a course towards
equilibrium.
In addition, whereas Pettit’s account focuses only on robust
goods, it is possible in similar fashion to define modally robust ills
as ills that deliver non-robust harms in a range of counterfactual
scenarios. For example, malevolence towards someone is a robust
ill because it delivers harm in a range of counterfactual scenarios.
If someone harbors malevolence towards you, then not only are
they going to harm you in the actual world when it is easy for
them, but also they will go out of their way to harm you in nearby
possible worlds where they face obstacles to harming you. And,
just as robust goods can be embodied by both individuals and
institutions, so robust ills can be embodied by both individuals and
institutions. For example, Kate Manne [23] argues that misogyny is
a set of institutionalized social norms and expectations (and related
behaviors) that function to enforce patriarchal oppression. Women
who deviate from patriarchal norms and expectations are punished
by misogynistic actions and emotional reactions, whereas women
who conform to such norms and expectations are rewarded.
1.2 A deontological argument for the value of
recourse
Pettit’s account of robust goods presupposes a consequentialist
normative ethics. For those more sympathetic to deontological or
Kantian ethics, a closely related argument may be more appealing.
In particular, deontologists tend to place great value (indeed, in
many cases, supreme value) on human dignity. But what is dignity?
For Kant (e.g., Groundwork 4:431) and his interpreters (e.g., [35],
[20], [15]), dignity is grounded in humanity, which in turn is typ-
ically understood as involving two closely-connected capacities.
First, humanity involves the capacity to select ends or goals. Sec-
ond, humanity involves the capacity to be autonomous. It should
be clear from the discussion in the previous section that the ca-
pacity to select goals is deeply dependent on the sort of long-term,
temporally-extended agency that recourse makes possible. What
about autonomy? While there are of course disagreements among
interpreters about how best to understand Kantian autonomy, ac-
cording to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, it involves "the
capacity to freely direct, shape, and determine the meaning of one’s
own life" [7]. Again, this seems to be exactly the sort of long-term
planning and self-direction that recourse as we have formulated it
helps to secure.
Other philosophers working in the deontological tradition with-
out hewing quite as closely to the orthodox Kantian line offer similar
analyses of the meaning and importance of dignity. For example,
Griffin [12] contends that the source of human dignity is our ca-
pacity to form, revise, and pursue what we take to be worthwhile
lives. Likewise, Raz [28] says that "Respecting human dignity en-
tails treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting
their future." And Fuller [10] emphasizes that constraints on human
agency thus understood should be understandable to the people on
whom they are imposed. One very clear way in which to make the
constraints under which someone operates understandable to them
is to explain what it would take for the rules (including algorithmic
rules) to spit out a different result.
These reflections suggest that – regardless of whether you favor
a consequentialist or a deontological normative ethical framework
– recourse will turn out to be a fundamental good for anyone who
lives in the sort of society that many people currently inhabit.
Unless we think that algorithmic and bureaucratic systems – which
exist in domains as diverse as criminal justice, credit scoring, hiring,
insurance, and voter certification – are or could soon be made
infallible, we must place a high value on recourse, on the ability
to know what it would take to get a different outcome from high-
stakes decisions arrived at by algorithms and bureaucracies.
2 RECOURSE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE
The study of recourse in automated decision making is a relatively
recent phenomenon that has till now proceeded without being
firmly embedded in a philosophical framework such as Pettit’s.
The first paper that explicitly addresses it is the work of Ustun et
al.[31]. They define recourse as “the ability of a person to change the
[harmful] decision of the model through actionable input variables”
and then present an algorithm that generates candidate changes
of variables that would reverse an algorithm’s decision (these sets
of variables are called flipsets in their work)6. Two aspects of their
definition are noteworthy. Firstly, the word ‘actionable’ is an im-
portant part of their definition. By this, they mean that recourse is
defined in terms of features that a) can be changed by the individ-
ual and b) are (or should be7) relevant to the decision that they are
6Thus, they focus on token acts of exercising recourse, but they are also concerned
with the general state of enjoying systematic access to the power to reverse harmful
decisions.
7More on this ambiguity below.
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trying to achieve. For the first aspect, an example is that expecting
an individual to change their age or race in order to get a job is
not actionable, and therefore would not be considered part of any
flipset. The second aspect draws a contrast with other literature
that considers the problem of strategic manipulation of features
to achieve a desired goal[14, 16, 24]. In such cases, the individual
might change features that are (or should be) irrelevant to the de-
cision but that the individual has learned might be important to
manipulating the decision-making algorithm. For example, if a tool
that analyzes video interviews scores a smiling face highly, an in-
dividual might artificially smile in order to get a positive outcome
from the interview. Or if a tool that screens the dossiers of job
applicants rewards resumes of people named ‘Jared’, an applicant
might misrepresent or legally change their name to get a positive
outcome8.
Recourse is quantified as a “distance from the decision boundary.”
In the case of the linear classifiers studied by Ustun et al., this is
expressed as a sum of (weighted) distances along each dimension
(i.e., a weighted l1 distance) or as a sum of quantiles along each
dimension (feature). For example, consider a hypothetical example
of a linear classifier used to decide whether an applicant should
be admitted to a university based on two features: their SAT score
and their high-school GPA. GPA has a range from 0-4, and assume
that it is considered equally difficult to make an improvement of
0.1 in the GPA as it is to make a 10 point improvement in the SAT
score. Then, in order to measure recourse, we would associate a
“weight” of 100 with the GPA and a “weight” of 1 with the SAT score.
Suppose now that the linear classifier is willing to trade off GPA
with the SAT score, and the automated system yields a positive
outcome if the following condition is true:
0.5 × SAT1500 + 0.5 ×
GPA
3 ≥ 1
Informally, this rule captures the idea that an SAT score of 1500
and a GPA of at least 3.0 is sufficient for the system to recommend
admission. Consider now a student with a GPA of 3.0 and an SAT
score of 1200, as illustrated in Figure 1. A quick calculation reveals
that the effort needed to change their SAT score to 1500 (and there-
fore qualify) is 1500-1200=300, whereas the effort needed to update
their GPA to 3.6 (and therefore qualify) is 100(3.6-3.0)=600. Thus,
the cheaper way to reverse the algorithm’s decision would be for
the student retake the SAT and get a score of 1500 or greater. Notice
that this calculation incorporates the effort of studying for the SAT
again, taking the test another time, and so on into the weights of
100 versus 1. If in fact it was more onerous to retake the SAT, then
these weights would need to be modified, possibly indicating a
different optimal flipset.
Challenges left open by [31] include computing “distance to the
boundary” when the space is not linear (and might be a manifold)
as well as dealing with black-box classifiers for which it might be
difficult to measure distance to the decision boundary. Recent work
by Joshi et al[17] addresses these issues directly, as well integrating
causal frameworks into the estimation of recourse. Gupta et al[13]
extend recourse calculations to support vector machines as well
8This example is based on a real case (https://qz.com/1427621/companies-are-on-the-
hook-if-their-hiring-algorithms-are-biased/). The other main factor that the algorithm
rewarded was having played lacrosse in high school.
Figure 1: Two flipsets for a student denied admission to uni-
versity based on theirGPAand SAT. The student could either
improve their GPA by 0.6 (represented by the vertical blue
vector) or improve their SAT by 300 (represented by the hor-
izontal green vector.
as looking at the problem of equalizing the average recourse with
respect to different demographic subgroups.
Work on recourse builds on earlier research on explanations in
machine learning via counterfactuals by Wachter et al.[32]. In that
work, the authors argue that, for a number of reasons linked to
considerations provided by the European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), it would be beneficial to have counterfactual
explanations of decisions. A counterfactual explanation is of the
form “If variable V took different values, the decision would have
been different.” 9 Wachter et al. argue that such explanations furnish
the information necessary to contest decisions as well as exercise
recourse, and they suggest ways in which one might produce such
a counterfactual from a given model.
Counterfactual explanations have proven to be a popular frame-
work for generating explanations[18, 29]. However, an explanation
in and of itself need not provide recourse if it is merely provid-
ing insight into the decision process of the system. In this paper
we focus on recourse directly because of its connection to trust
and temporally-extended agency, but many of our critiques and
interventions can be applied when appropriate to other forms of
explanations. For a detailed exposition of the nature of explana-
tions in decision-making, see the work of Selbst and Barocas [30].
Barocas, Selbst and Raghavan[4] provide a more focused critique
of counterfactual explanations.
9Philosophers will be familiar with this approach from Kenneth Waters’s “difference
maker” account of causality[33].
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3 CRITIQUING EXTANT APPROACHES TO
RECOURSE
In this section, we present a number of criticisms of the existing
work on recourse.We beginwithmore philosophical and conceptual
criticisms. As we progress, the criticisms become more technical.
Since it is envisioned that recourse should be implemented algorith-
mically in real socio-technical systems, it is important to address
both types of criticisms.
3.1 Conceptually distinguishing appeal from
recourse narrowly conceived
Large datasets that algorithms use to make decisions almost al-
ways contain errors – sometimes many errors. This means that an
algorithmic decision might be unfavorable for two very different
reasons. First, the adverse decision could be based on correct and
comprehensive data. For instance, someone may have defaulted on
multiple loans and therefore be genuinely ineligible for another
loan unless they improve their financial situation. This is the type
of decision that Ustun et al. seem to have in mind throughout their
paper. Second, the adverse decision could be based on faulty or
incomplete data. For instance, someone may be recorded as hav-
ing defaulted on a loan when in fact they repaid it on time and
in full, or they be recorded as having no credit history when in
fact they have taken out and repaid several loans. In the case of a
correct-but-unfavorable decision, the recommended flipset would
enumerate the actions that the agent would need to undertake to
receive a more favorable decision from the algorithm. Call this
the exercise of recourse narrowly conceived. In the latter case, the
recommended flipset would enumerate rectifications that need to
be made to the dataset so that the person will receive the correct
(favorable) decision. Call this appeal. Recourse narrowly conceived
and appeal both promote and protect peace of mind and warrant
for trust. Someone who inhabits a socio-technical system rife with
errors and no prospect of appeal is just as badly off as (and perhaps
worse off than) someone who inhabits an error-free socio-technical
system that offers no understandable ways to have unfavorable
decisions reversed. Both lack a fundamental robust good and are
thus liable to all the stress and anxiety and inability to trust that
lack of recourse entails. Thus, while the distinction between appeal
and the exercise of recourse narrowly conceived is external to the
workings of the mathematical model, it is important to bear in mind
when considering how to implement recourse broadly conceived
through policy. We flag examples of the distinction below.
3.2 Who decides what’s actionable?
As wementioned in section 2 above, a key feature of recourse is that
it is actionable, meaning that the recommendations in flipsets should
only include the sorts of actions that the individual who receives
them might be able to enact of their own volition, and which are
relevant (in some unspecified sense) to the decision at hand. For
example, in the context of credit scoring, one might plausibly count
the number of credit cards someone has as an actionable variable.
It is reasonable to expect that someone could increase or decrease
the number of credit cards they have (though, of course, not below
zero or to infinity). It is also reasonable to allow for variables to be
actionable or vary only in one direction like a person’s age (which
can only increase) and possession of a Ph.D. (which can go from
FALSE to TRUE but not conversely). But deciding which features
are actionable and which are not can be problematic. For example,
consider an individual’s current debt load (presented by [31] as an
actionable variable). Naturally, it is easy to increase one’s debt load.
But consider the case of an American with a gigantic student loan.
If the interest rate on their loan is high enough, they may never
be able to pay it down. Moreover, in the United States it is illegal
to discharge student debt (alone among all other types of debt) in
bankruptcy except in very unusual circumstances10. It is therefore
unclear whether debt load should be considered fully actionable.
This is just one example, but they can be proliferated. Two further
variables considered actionable by [31] are whether someone has
a savings account and whether they have a retirement account.
Consider the case of an undocumented immigrant. Is such a person
in a position to flip the values of these variables from FALSE to
TRUE? If not, they are not truly actionable variables, only actionable
for some individuals. There are even more complex features, such as
race and even gender, where the notion of what is actionable leads to
deeper questions about identity and social constructs that are well
beyond the scope of this paper.While we do not want to take a stand
on these fraught questions here, we assert that it should not be left
to algorithm designers to (perhaps unconsciously) build into their
models their implicit assumptions about areas far beyond the scope
of their training and expertise, especially given that their models
might have policy implications. The point of embedding recourse
into a socio-technical system is to give people peace of mind, the
ability to exercise temporally-extended agency, and warrant for
trust. If the design of the system does not involve input from people
who fully appreciate the costs imposed by unfavorable decisions
and the agency of those to whom flipsets are to be recommended,
it will not live up to these essential desiderata.
3.3 Who exercises recourse on behalf of whom?
The framework of recourse is highly individualistic – indeed, we
contend, unreasonably so. In this framework, each individual is
characterized by a vector of features x and a binary label y, which
takes the value -1 when disfavorable and 1 when favorable. The
features are the values assigned to the individual by each column of
the dataset that characterizes them. The label indicates, for example,
whether they are creditworthy, hirable, etc. Recourse for the individ-
ual characterized by (x,y) is then determined by whether there is
an action a such that f (x) = −1 but f (x+a) = 1. This mathematical
formulation of recourse is silent on a key issue: whether the setA(x)
of available actions from which a is to be selected a set of actions
that only the individual herself can perform. In other words, it is
assumed that recourse for a person is necessarily recourse by them.
In many low-stakes circumstances, this is a plausible assumption.
If the height-scanning app at the amusement park says that I am
too short to ride the roller-coaster, I am well-poised to object by
insisting that a tape-measure be used to check my actual height.
Who better to advocate for me than me? (This would be a case of
appeal rather than an exercise of recourse narrowly conceived.)
10For a brief discussion of this sorry state of affairs, see https://www.forbes.com/sites/
zackfriedman/2019/01/09/student-loans-bankruptcy-discharge/#4fe7c4416d56
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That said, many cases in which recourse is essential do not fit this
paradigm. Consider a case in which a health insurance company
declines to reimburse a medical intervention because it is “non-
routine.” The patient is in the hospital with a morphine drip that
makes them incapable of concentrating for more than a few hours
each day. Their family and friends understand that if the “non-
routine” label is not reversed to “routine,” the patient may face bills
that will bankrupt them (another example of appeal rather than of
the exercise of recourse narrowly conceived). We suggest that the
only normatively acceptable conception of recourse in this scenario
is one in which the family and friends are also able to take actions
on behalf of the patient. In an individualistic system, someonemight
reasonably refuse to undergo medical treatment because they are
worried that they will be unable to exercise recourse on their own
behalf during recovery. Moreover, we note that this sort of case is
going to be especially common among children, the elderly, people
with disabilities, people who are undocumented, people who are
less well-educated, and so on. In order to ensure that the most
disadvantaged members of society can sincerely and reasonably
expect to be able to get unfavorable decisions, recourse must be
conceived of less individualistically and more communally.
3.4 Strategic manipulation versus undoing
unfair outcomes
As mentioned earlier, An implicit critique of recourse appears in
papers that concern themselves with strategic manipulation of a
classifier to reverse an (otherwise-justified) outcome. Examples
include the idea that if we revealed the algorithm behind search
ranking, entities will manipulate the algorithm to place themselves
higher on the list (often called ‘search engine optimization’ or SEO),
or that if we revealed the algorithm behind a credit scoring system,
then an individual could inspect the algorithm and improve their
attributes strategically to get a good score.
The debate over whether an individual is seeking to exercise
recourse or merely strategically manipulating a classifier rests on
the answer to an ambiguous question: are the set of attributes being
changed relevant to success at the task or not? If we construe rele-
vance descriptively, then this question just asks whether changing
a particular set of attributes would result in a different decision by
the algorithm. By contrast, if we construe relevance normatively,
the question asks what attributes should make a difference. For
example, a risk assessment algorithm trained on historical data is
likely to treat the attribute of race as relevant. However, we might
agree that race should not be taken into account when deciding
whether to grant bail. In the ideal case, an algorithmwould take into
account all and only the attributes that should make a difference.
Of course, this is rarely if ever the case. Instead, algorithms almost
always use proxies for attributes of interest, and the gap between
the attribute of interest and its proxy opens up the possibility of
strategic manipulation. If this gap is too large or too easily exploited,
we may question whether the algorithm itself is valid. Consider the
example of an African-American job-seeker changing their name
in order for their CV to be taken seriously, or a female academic
job seeker muting any indicators of her gender in order to get a
favorable assessment by a hiring committee11. One can easily argue
that the attributes being changed (e.g., the name) are not relevant
to the task (success at the job). However, the classifier treats these
attributes as relevant. Because the classifier appears to be blatantly
unfair, such manipulation may be justified all-things-considered.
In any case, this determination rests on which attributes are con-
sidered relevant or irrelevant, which itself can be controversial and
touches on deeper arguments about the difference between the
world-as-it-is and the world-as-it-should-be.
3.5 Changes in the classifier over time
Classifiers change. As more and more data is incorporated into
a model, the rule for classification might change its dependence
on input attributes. Suppose at some time t an unfavorable deci-
sion is made about an individual. They request and are provided
with various flipset options, each of which might involve some
investment of time and effort. Later, at time t ′ > t , the individual
returns and expects a favorable decision to be made. But now the
classifier has changed, and the attributes that would have given the
individual success in the original classification will no longer do
so. For example, there might be a GPA cutoff to gain entry into a
computer science major at a university. A student learns what the
cutoff is, determines how much they need to improve their GPA
to gain admittance (the flipset), and retakes a few classes to get an
improved grade. However, by the time their coursework is complete
(say, a year later), the threshold has increased again (for example,
due to increased demand) and their new GPA is still not sufficient
for entry into the major. Since the goal of recourse is to ensure
that people can plan and can reasonably trust the socio-technical
system that makes decisions about them, this temporal dimension
needs to be taken into account.
3.6 Qualification
Sometimes, perhaps often, the cheapest or easiest way for someone
to ensure a more favorable decision from an algorithm is just too
expensive or onerous. For example, consider a prospective pilot
whose eyesight is not sufficiently acute to be qualified to fly a
plane. If the only recourse for such a person is either to undergo
a somewhat risky LASIK surgery or eye transplant, that might be
too costly/risky to recommend. The recommended flipset for such
a person would involve more effort than they are willing or able
to put out. Is it wise – or humane – to offer a flipset in a case
like this? Prompting someone with an overly burdensome way of
reversing an adverse decision suggests that if they do not follow the
suggestion, they have only themselves to blame for their situation.
We should be reluctant to make people feel guilty for failing to rise
to standards that are beyond what could be reasonably expected
of them, as this runs directly contrary to the trust that recourse
is meant to foster. As Case & Deaton (2015, 2017) have shown,
the despair associated with such self-blame has had a measurable
impact on both mortality and morbidity in middle-aged, white
non-Hispanic Americans, leading to increases in drug overdoses,
suicides, and alcoholism. Casually building such standards in to a
recourse algorithm is therefore to be avoided.
11There are numerous examples of race and gender bias in the academic hiring process.
The most recent one is [8] about bias in the physics postdoc process.
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3.7 Features are not always jointly actionable
An implicit assumption in formulations of recourse is that if at-
tribute X is actionable and attribute Y is actionable, then X and Y
are jointly actionable. We contend that this is not necessarily so.
Consider for example, the attributes of spending, debt-payment
patterns, and educational attainment. It might be the case that
someone who single-mindedly focused on one of these variables
would find it actionable, but acting on all three simultaneously may
prove challenging or even impossible. For instance, someone could
quit their job, take on student loans, and work their way through
a master’s degree, thus increasing educational attainment at the
cost of their finances. Alternatively, the same person could take
on overtime hours, work at paying down their debt, and neglect
their education. If the flipset recommended to such a person in-
cluded only combinations of actions in which they increased their
educational attainment, decreased their spending, and increased
the amount of debt they paid down per month, it might seem ac-
tionable without actually being so. As before, the point of recourse
is to ensure that people can reasonably expect that, were they to
receive an unfavorable decision, they would have some way to get
that decision reversed. If the algorithm that recommends flipsets
serves up non-compossible combinations of actions, they cannot
reasonably expect this.
On a related note, recall that the bureaucratic and algorithmic de-
cisions for which we might seek recourse are ubiquitous. Thus, we
cannot treat recourse as something that one might seek in isolation
from all the other things happening in one’s life. An example from
the academic job market should illustrate this. In many disciplines,
there is a stark contrast between the desirable CV of someone ap-
plying for a job at a research university and the desirable CV of
someone applying for a job at a small liberal arts college. Consider
the case of someone who completely strikes out on the job market.
When they ask interviewing committees from research universities
what they could do to improve their chances (i.e., when they ask
for a flipset), they are told to publish more and in more prestigious
venues. When they ask interviewing committees from small liberal
arts colleges what they could do to improve their chances, they
are told not to publish any more and instead to build up a longer
and stronger track record of undergraduate teaching. Pursuing one
flipset makes the other no longer actionable. We expect that this
sort of dilemma is liable to crop up not just on the academic job mar-
ket but in many domains. Treating recourse atomistically obscures
and could even exacerbate such problems.
3.8 Diversity of cost functions
A key modeling element of recourse is the cost function governing
one’s ability to modify one’s attributes. There is nothing intrinsic to
the definition of recourse that requires that everyone must have use
the same cost function – however in practice it is important that
the cost function be known, and so it is more practical to assume a
fixed cost function. To return to our university admissions example,
we might assume that the effort required to improve one’s GPA is
the same for everyone, and that the effort required to improve one’s
SAT score is also the same for everyone. This is manifestly untrue,
however. Some students may find it much easier to improve their
score on a one-off standardized test than others. Likewise, some
students may find it easier to improve their GPA than others. For
those who find it easier to improve their SAT score, retaking the
test should be in their recommended flipset. By contrast, for those
who find it easier to improve their GPA, retaking courses should
be in their flipset. However, in many – perhaps most – actual cases,
the algorithm is not going to know which student is which. In [31],
this problem is addressed by allowing the system to return multiple
“flipsets” – ways to take action to remedy an unfavorable outcome –
as a recognition of this potential lack of knowledge of the true cost
function. However, even this approach does not truly engage with
the modeling uncertainty in the cost function.
One way to respond to this problem is to recommend the average
or the modal shortest-path across the decision threshold or even
express costs relatively in terms of percentiles based on the training
data (as Ustun et al also do in their work). However, either of those
approaches privileges the majority or the plurality at the expense
of minorities and outliers. If, as we suggested above, we want to be
especially careful not to disadvantage those who are least well off,
then these approaches are problematic.
4 REVISING AND IMPLEMENTING
RECOURSE
From the perspective of recourse as a modally robust good, the spe-
cific algorithmic recourse proposals fall shy in the ways described
above. In this section, we articulate a revised approach to recourse
that responds to the criticisms canvassed in the previous section.
Each of the subsections here addresses its correlative subsection
from Section 3 above.
4.1 Disjunctive instructions for flipsets
Because datasets contain errors and omissions, any flipset recom-
mended to an individual might specify a set of attributes that they
already satisfy. In such a situation, the individual would need to
appeal for rectification of the dataset rather than exercise recourse
narrowly conceived. For this reason, flipsets should come with
disjunctive instructions. For example:
We are sorry that you did not receive a favor-
able outcome. Our model indicates that if your
profile were changed in the following way [at-
tributesX ,Y ,Z . . . ], you would receive a favor-
able outcome. If you believe that your profile
should already characterize you in this way,
you can appeal the decision by contacting [rel-
evant authority]. Otherwise, you have until
[date] to make these changes and then seek
to exercise recourse.
This way of framing the flipset recognizes that the dataset may
contain errors or omissions.
4.2 Stakeholder and expert panels to establish
acceptable action sets.
Recall that it is not appropriate for computer scientists to build their
own implicit or explicit assumptions about what is and what is not
actionable into a recourse algorithm. Likewise, it is generally not
advisable for computer scientists to build their implicit or explicit
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assumptions into the construction of training datasets. In both
cases, the best practice, which is also more defensible and relieves
computer scientists of burdens they are not typically trained to
handle, is to engage in systematic consultation with stakeholders
and relevant domain experts in the humanities and social sciences.
Just as training data needs to be generated carefully and in a way
that respects various ethical and epistemic constraints, so action sets
for use in a recourse algorithm need to be generated carefully and
in a way that respects various ethical and epistemic constraints. Of
course, this does not guarantee that the resulting training datasets
or action sets are guaranteed to be infallible, but it does respect the
rights and local expertise of those who are best positioned to say
which attributes are genuinely actionable.
4.3 Fiduciaries
As we explained above, in instances in which someone may need
recourse (either via appeal or via the exercise of recourse narrowly
construed), they may not be well-positioned to act on their own
behalf. This is especially the case when it comes to children, the
elderly, people with disabilities, people who are undocumented,
people who are less well-educated, and others at the margins of so-
ciety. To ensure that these people have adequate access to recourse,
we recommend that any socio-technical system in which recourse
is embedded make a role for fiduciaries who are charged to act on
behalf of those they represent. A fiduciary may be a family member,
someone with the power of attorney, or a representative appointed
by a court or other body. In this way, we relax the extreme indi-
vidualism implicitly assumed by Ustun et al. so that recourse for x
can be recourse exercised by y or z orw on behalf of x . Recall that
their framework for providing recourse includes a cost for updating
any individual feature, and that this is specific to the individual
requesting recourse. Setting aside the issue of how to set the costs
for a given individual, there is no reason the system cannot use
costs associated with the fiduciary rather than with the harmed
party.
4.4 Auditing the gap between normative and
proxy attribute sets
As we explained above, there are two senses in which an attribute
or set of attributes might be relevant to an algorithmic decision.
Descriptively, an attribute is relevant when it makes a difference to
the classification. Normatively, an attribute is relevant when it is
the sort of thing that should make a difference to the classification.
Because normative attributes are typically difficult or impossible to
measure directly, datasets tend to use descriptive proxies. The gap
between a normative attribute and its proxy can lead to misclassifi-
cation in both directions: favorable when the correct classification
is unfavorable, and unfavorable when the correct classification is fa-
vorable. There is no automatic way to handle this problem. Instead,
proxies need to be chosen with care, and the gap [9] between nor-
mative and proxy attribute sets must be audited on a regular basis.
The same panel of stakeholders and domain experts envisioned in
section 5.1 would probably be well-positioned to do such auditing.
4.5 Handling change over time via ex post facto
and lex mitior
Recall that classifiers change. In the time between when a flipset is
recommended and when its criteria are fulfilled, a classifier may
have changed in such a way that the individual who received the
recommendation no longer qualifies. This is frustrating and makes
it difficult to plan. Furthermore, such scenarios are likely to crop up
more and more as algorithms become embedded in a wide range of
mundane decision making processes. If recourse is to be employed
in such contexts, it needs to suggest flipsets that have indefinite
temporal stability or clear expiration dates. One option would be to
follow the precedent set in United States law, according to which ex
post facto laws12 that disadvantage the accused are not binding[22].
Translated to the context of algorithms and recourse, this would
mean that if someone receives a flipset recommendation, it should
be valid forever or come with an expiration date. Then, if the person
satisfies the criteria in the flipset (before the expiration date), they
automatically gain whatever benefit they were pursuing even if the
rules for others have changed in the meantime.
An alternative option would be to follow the precedent set in
European law: namely, lex mitior (or “milder law”) [34], according to
which the milder rule is the one that applies. In the case of the GPA
cutoff sketched above, if the admission criteria become more strict,
then anyone who was recommended a flipset prior to the change
should be eligible under the old rules. By contrast, if the admission
criteria become less strict, then the new standards should be used
for everyone. In cases where there is no well-defined ordering
of strictness, individuals should be able to choose for themselves
whether they are judged by the old or new criteria. Implementing
either of these options assumes that the flipset is recommended
by those with enough institutional power to ensure that either
the ex post facto or lex mitior rule is applied. If, instead, the flipset
is recommended by a third party, such as a consulting firm or
independent coach, the flipset should at least be accompanied by a
very clear warning that the rules may change.
4.6 Introducing an upper bound on costs
As we pointed out above, sometimes even the cheapest or least
onerous way to reverse an unfavorable decision is to expensive or
burdensome. To handle this problem, we suggest introducing an
upper bound to the cost threshold when calculating a flipset. If even
the cheapest option exceeds this threshold, the individual would
receive a recommendation like the following:
Sorry, but in your case recourse does not seem
to be a feasible option because even the least
burdensome avenue to reversing the decision
is probably too onerous for you to pursue. In
particular, the easiest way for you to receive a
favorable decision is <details of recourse>. You
are of course welcome to pursue this option,
but please do bear in mind that it may be exces-
sively costly.
In this way, the individual would still see their best flipset (which, if
all they need to do is appeal rather than exercise recourse narrowly
12That is, laws that take effect retroactively.
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conceived, may in fact be feasible), but the flipset would not be
provided as a recommendation so much as an explanation of why
it may not be worth pursuing recourse.
One interesting advantage of using upper bounds on costs is
that we can count the number (or proportion) of times this upper
bound on cost is reached. A large value would indicate systemic
society-wide problems in the application of recourse and indicate a
need for deeper structural reforms13
4.7 Changing the geometry of the intervention
space.
The problem with features that might vary jointly is that the as-
sumption of independence – that features can be modified sep-
arately and without incurring extra cost – is broken. A purely
mathematical approach to addressing this is to modify the under-
lying geometry in which the distance associated with recourse is
being calculated. In particular, dependency among attributes corre-
sponding to moving along a submanifold of the underlying vector
space – informally, a curved surface in the space, rather than the
entirety of the space itself. From a purely technical perspective, the
challenge is then to compute (shortest) distances in this submani-
fold to the boundary, which while difficult to do within the existing
frameworks is still amenable to analysis via methods for manipu-
lating manifold geometry that are common in machine learning.
Indeed, recent articles seeks to do precisely this via estimating the
submanifold via data sampling[17].
The bigger challenge is how to learn and encode this submani-
fold. Doing so requires a deeper knowledge of the ways in which
different features interact, as well as the relative costs associated
with modifying dependent features. This places a greater burden on
the modelers of the system, reflecting a tradeoff between how well
the recourse calculation reflects the real world and the ease of use
of the system. Note that an alternate modeling tradeoff is to merely
assert that features are actionable separately in order to prioritize
explainability of the method of recourse over effectiveness. Again,
we point out that [17] seeks to address this via the explicit use of
causal models.
4.8 Handling diversity of cost functions via
personalization
Because different people have different cost functions associated
with the attributes on which a classifier operates, a one-size-fits-all
approach to constructing flipsets may not be advisable. In cases in
which a great deal is known about the individual for whom a recom-
mendation is to be made, using their personal cost function should
make it possible to offer a bespoke flipset. Such personalization may
be difficult to achieve, however, or may infringe on privacy rights.
If the recommendation is not personalized, as current notions of
recourse are, then it might be better to recommend several different
options.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we used the fact that temporally-extended agency
and trust are fundamental to human flourishing to argue for the
13We thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
importance of recourse. We understand recourse as the modally ro-
bust good that delivers the correlative non-robust good of reversing
unfavorable decisions across a range of counterfactual scenarios.
Someone who enjoys recourse and knows that they enjoy it is bet-
ter positioned to engage in long-term planning and to trust that, if
something were to go wrong on the way towards their long-term
goals, they would not fall victim to precarity but rather be able to set
themselves right again. We then pointed out that many of the deci-
sions for which people might want recourse are made by algorithms
and bureaucracies. This in turn suggests that these socio-technical
systems should be implemented in a way that automatically deliv-
ers suggested flipsets to people about who unfavorable decisions
are made. In the remaining two sections of the paper, we raised
some problems for the existing literature on algorithmic recourse,
then addressed these problems to the extent possible.
In closing, we want to address an objection that we expect many
readers may have: namely, that recourse is a red herring that will
only distract us from the more fundamental problems of precar-
ity. After all, one might think that if precarity were (much) less
severe than it currently is, there would be little need for recourse.
Moreover, one might worry that focusing on recourse places yet
an additional burden on individuals as they navigate complex and
challenging socio-technical systems. Wouldn’t it be better to focus
on systemic solutions that don’t require individual attention and
intervention? Are we suggesting that if you had an opportunity to
take advantage of recourse and neglected to do so, you only have
yourself to blame? What if (as seems likely) disadvantaged people
are also those who most frequently need to resort to recourse, yet
have the least bandwidth – in terms of time, energy, money, and
social connections – to do so?
We take these concerns seriously. However, we do not see why
the matter should be conceived as a binary choice: either alleviate
underlying precarity or treat its symptoms via recourse. We would
like to think that academics concerned about social justice can, as
it were, walk and chew gum at the same time.
But there is a deeper point to be made in this connection. Re-
course is an already-extant good. We are not proposing to introduce
it to a system where it is absent. Instead, we are proposing to ame-
liorate its distribution in a system where it is very much present.
Indeed, the availability and effectiveness of recourse in contem-
porary societies is itself unequally distributed in much the same
way that primary goods are. If you are wealthy, you can pay a
lawyer to get a parking ticket expunged. If you are powerful, you
can use backchannels to get your failson accepted to a prestigious
university on a sham athletic scholarship. If you are well-connected,
you can call in favors to land yourself a job that would otherwise
have gone to someone else. These are all cases in which recourse is
already being employed. Our aim is to establish a more adequate
conceptualization and operationalization of the phenomenon, not
to introduce it into a system where it does not already exist.
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